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PART THREE
PROPERTY LAW

SURVEY OF REAL PROPERTY LAW
RALPH BOYER*, JACK ANKUS**, ROBERT FRIEDMAN

'

"

INTRODUCTION
The importance of property matters in Florida jurisprudence and econony is again evidenced by the mass of litigation and the amount of significant legislation in this area during the past biennium.' The creation of a

Department of Water resources, 2 the change in procedure for the disposition
of submerged lands, 3 and amendments to the dower' and mechanics' lien
laws 5 are among the most important legislative enactments.
Litigation concerning the homestead continued in significant quantity,
and important issues relative to joint bank accounts indicate that these

survivorship accounts7 will continue to plague the courts. Factually interesting cases8 arising from the mistaken improvement of wrong land reached
pragmatic results at the apparent expense of some time honored equitable
principles. The rights of owners adjacent to vacated streets where all conveyances were made in reference to a plat were adjudicated in a case of first
impression, 9 and disputed boundaries, 0 tax titles" and mechanics' liens' 2
frequently required judicial decision.
The subject is divided into seven principle headings as follows:
I. Vendor and Purchaser.
II. Deeds: Recording, Delivery, Cancellation and Reformation.
*-Professor of Law, School of Law, University of Miami.
**-Student, School of Law, University of Miami.
* -Student,
School of Law, University of Miami.
1. The material in this survey includes the cases reported in 82 So.2d (Fla. 1955)
through 96 So.2d 592 (Fla. 1957) and the enactments of the 1957 legislature.
2. FLA. STAT. §§ 373.071-373.251 (1957). See subtitle IV, Rights In Land, in text.
3. FLA. STAT. § 731.35(3) (1957).
4. FLA. STAT. § 84.05(11)(a) (1957).
5. Laws of Fla. c. 57-302 (1957).
6. See subtitle III, Estates, Dower, Homestead and Future Interests, in text.
7. See subtitle Il, Estates, Dower, Homestead and Future Interests, in text.
8. Voss. v. Forgue, 84 So.2d 563 (Fla. 1956); Chavis v. Citizens Federal Savings
and Loan Ass'n., 95 So.2d 581 (Fla. 1957); see subheading I, Vendor and Purchaser, in
text.
9. Servandoo Building Co. v. Zimmerman, 91 So.Zd 289 (Fla. 1956). See subtitle
V, Special Titles, Dedication, infra.
10. See subtitle V, Special Titles, note 176 infra.
11. See subtitle V, Special Titles, in text.
12. See subtitle VI, Liens and Mortgages, in text.
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Estates, Dower, Homestead and Future Interests.
Rights in Land.
Special Titles.
Liens and Mortgages.
Landlord and Tenant.

No special section is provided to discuss new legislation as that material
is incorporated into the appropriate principle division listed above. Legislative changes are indicated at the beginning of the appropriate material by
the subheading legislation. Thus, a unified treatment of each topic is
achieved. Access to particular material is provided by the generous use of
headings and subheadings.
I.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER

Legislation: Conveyances by corporations delinquent in tax payments;
curative acts.-A new act I3 specifically validating conveyances by corporations
delinquent in the payment of taxes should have a salutary effect on the
marketablity of titles and ease the burden of title examiners. Heretofore the
corporate taxing statute in effect prior to 1949, providing that corporations
delinquent for six months should forfeit their charter privileges and be denied
the facilities of the state courts,' 4 had cast doubt on the ability of such
corporations to make valid conveyances. The preamble to the new act
expressly states that it was not the intent of the legislature to place any
undue restraint on the alienation of real property,' and the act itself provides
that conveyances, whether heretofore or hereafter made, by corporations not
dissolved or expired, shall be valid notwithstanding they may be delinquent
in the payment of their taxes.' 0 It will still be necessary, however, to ascer,tain that the corporation was in fact in existence at the time it received
or conceived title. Another act' 7 validates deeds executed by limited guardians appointed under the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship law.' 8
Mistaken improvement of another's land. - The equitable principle "all
land is unique"' 9 and a doctrine of the common law, "improvements placed
on another's land without the consent of the owner become part of the
realty and title vests in the fee owner" 20 were disregarded by the supreme

13. FLA. STAT. § 692.04 (1957).
14. FLA. STAT. § 610.11 (1931) now repealed. This statute has been replaced by
FLA. STAT. § 608.35 (1957) which simply provides that such delinquent corporations
shall not be permitted to prosecute or defend actions in the state courts.
15. FLA. LAWS 1957, c. 57-264 (preamble).
16. FLA. STAT. § 692.04 (1957).
17. FLA. STAT. § 694.14 (1957).
18, FLA, STAT. §§ 293.01-293.20 (1955).
19. McCLUNTO¢c, EQUITY § 44, p. 105 (2nd Ed. 1948).
20. McCreary v. Lake Boulevard Sponge Exchange Co., 133 Fla. 740, 183 So.7
(1938).
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court in Voss v. Forgue.21 The court in this case was faced with the problem
of a person by mistake building a dwelling upon his neighbor's lot. The
builder became aware of his mistake when he was almost finished and filed
a bill in equity praying that he be allowed to purchase his neighbor's lot at
a fair value or, in the alternative, that his neighbor be forced to purchase the
building at a reasonable price. The chancellor entered a decree ordering
the parties to exchange lots, both lots being substantially alike and neither
having any intrinsic value. The decree was affirmed, the court saying,
"There is no contention that either of the lots has any peculiar or intrinsic
value. We do not approve appellee's carelessness or laxness in looking to
the location of his lot but there is no showing that the appellant was
harmed. '22 Proof that this wasn't a once-in-a-million decision based upon a
once-in-a-million fact situation was the case of Chavis v. Citizens Federal
Savings and Loan Ass'n.2 1 In this case, thirteen months later, the court was
presented with an identical set of facts; the houses were the same value, the
lots were the same size, the chancellor ruled the same way-and the court
affirmed on the basis of the Voss case.24 The equity-minded supreme court,
disregarding some time-honored principles, 25 apparently applied the maxim,
"The Court of equity should frame its decree so as to protect to the greatest
possible extent the conflicting interests of the parties." 28
Statute of Frauds; specific performance.-The cases involving specific
performance during the past biennium reaffirmed many of the established
principles of equitable remedies and announced very little new law. Specific
performance was held to be the proper remedy in Perry v. Benson27 even
though the vendee had brought a prior unsuccessful suit for the recission
of the contract based upon a defect in the title. The court held that the
vendee could waive the defect and bring the second action, such action
not being barred by the theory of election of remedies. The court, in
Mortgage Investment Foundation v. Eller,2s reversed the lower court's
strange refusal to grant specific performance to the successful claimant. In
this case one Kindell had brought an action for specific performance and
the appellant intervened, claiming that he also had a contract for the
purchase of the land in question. Kindell's suit was dismissed as appellant
was found to possess a paramount right. Nevertheless, the chancellor denied
specific performance to the appellant on the basis that the title would not
be clear until Kindell's time for appeal had run. The supreme court, stating
that the unsuccessful claimant might always appeal, held that this possi21.
22.
23.
24.
Jud. Cir.
25.
26.
27.
28.

84 So.2d 563 (Fla. 1956).
Id. at 564.
95 So.2d 581 (Fla. 1957).
These conclusions are derived from the court file, Chancery No. 18058 11th
Those referred to in the text to notes 19 and 20 supra.
MCCLINToIC EQUITY § 30, p. 78 (2nd Ed. 1948).
94 So.2d 819 (Fla. 1957).
93 So.2d 868 (Fla. 1957).
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bility should not be grounds for denying relief to the successful claimant.29
The statement, "If it is your client's intention to rescind the transaction
then the deposit of $200.00 should be returned," was held by a divided
court30 to be an offer of recission which was accepted by the vendor's letter
asking to whose order the draft should be drawn. Once rescinded, the
vendee's action for specific performance was properly dismissed. The chief
justice, in his dissenting opinion, felt that the statement of the vendee was
not a clear manifestation of an intention to rescind and, therefore, there
was no "meeting of the minds." 3' An agreement to rescind was probably
reached in Van Dame Estates v. May,32 but the failure to reduce to writing
the agreement to release the vendor was fatal to the vendor's defense in
an action for specific performance. This result necessarily followed when
it was affirmed that an agreement to release an interest in land is "squarely
within the statute of frauds." 33
The court found that the vendee in Gates v. Thompson8 4 was entitled
to equitable relief, but failed to specify in what manner the relief should
be afforded. The facts were that the vendor contracted to sell land of
which he only owned a one-half undivided interest, and the vendee brought
an action for specific performance. In reversing the lower court decree
dismissing the bill, the supreme court found the bill was not without
equity and recommended equitable relief.
The court held that an agreement between two developers of a subdivision to share the profits in a joint venture does not fall within the
Statute of Frauds. The agreement only stated that they would buy and
sell land together and did not reflect any property transactions between the
parties.86
Damages. - The question of penalties versus liquidated damages was
revisited by the court in Goldfarb v. Rovertson.31 It was held therein that
the earnest money deposited by a vendee was not returnable in the absence
of special circumstances when the vendee refused to consummate the

transaction. In the instant case the buyer demanded to see the books of
the business because he suspected that some of the stock was stolen
merchandise. The lower court found that there was no justification for
such a demand, and hence, the buyer was in default. Since the deposit
29. Id. at 870.

30. Hammond Realty Co. v. Wheaton, 90 So.2d 292 (Fla. 1956).
31. Id. at 294
32. 92 So.2d 816 (Fla. 1957),
33. Id. at 817. The Statute of Frauds is FLA. STAT. § 725.01 (1955).

34. 92 So.2d 420 (Fla. 1957).
35. Fla. R. Civ. P,1. 8 (b). "Every complaint shall be considered to pray for general relief," Such relief, for example, might include the imposition of a lien on the vendor's interest in order to enforce the return of plaintiff's deposit.
36. Russell v. Thielen, 82 So.2d 143 (Fla. 1955).
37. 82 So.2d 504 (Fla. 1955). See Boyer, Survey of Real Property 8 MIAMI LQ.
389,390 (1954).
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receipt contained no provision for stipulated damages, the amount of the
deposit was the proper measure under the proposition that a vendee in
default cannot recover sums paid on behalf of the purchase price.A8
Fraud; recission.-In this field the law has been well established in
Florida that lack of information due to careless indifference or the negligent
attitude of the buyer, in matters which are available to him through the
use of ordinary means, is not grounds for recission.' Those cases in which
the conveyance was set aside rested upon the individual facts in each case.
In one, the court held that a grant by an incompetent of his homestead
was subject to recission, 40 and in the second, a gratuitous conveyance of
property by a debtor to a close personal relative was quite properly held
fraudulent. 41
Miscellaneous.-The rule that a parol donee of land must show clear
and convincing proof of an intention to transfer title 42 was restated by
4
the court in McKinnon v. Commerford. 3 The parties in Cox v. Bellamy1
were rather confused as to their respective rights under an option, two
assignments of that option and a fourth document called "Option Renewal."
The confusion arose because of different provisions in the various instruments relative to the clearing of title. In some of the instruments the
vendees were given "reasonable times" starting at different dates to clear
the vendor's title. It was held that the vendor could not close out the
interest of the vendees until be had given them notice that a reasonable
45
time had expired.

II.

DEEDS: RECORDINc, DELrvERy, CANcUSI rION AND REFORMATION

Legislation; acknowledgments.-An amendment to the statute regulating
acknowledgments by members of the armed forces authorizes acknowledgment by spouses of military personnel in the same manner as acknowledgment by such personnel4
38. The rule was announced some time ago in Beatty v. Flannery, 49 So.2d 81 (Fla.
1950). See Boyer, note 37 suora.
39. In Frese v. Hayes, 240 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1957), the vendor recommended
that vendee save some money and not hire a surveyor despite the advice of an attorney
to obtain one. The court held that there was no fraud involved when the vendee later
discovered an encroachment.
In Barrett v. Quesnel, 90 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1956), vendee pleaded that he was
misinformed as to the income of the property, but the books were available for the vendee
and he never availed himself of the opportunity to examine them.
40. Hartnett v. Latauro, 82 So.2d 362 (Fla. 1955).
41. Cleveland Trust Co. v. Foster and Wentz, 93 So.2d 112 (Fla. 1957).
42. Todd v. Hyzer, 154 Fla. 702, 18 So.2d 888 (1944). See Boyer, Survey of Real
ProPerty, 8 MIAmi L.Q. 389, 393, 1954).
43. 88 So.2d 753 (Fla. 1956); see note 174 infra.
44. 93 So.2d 64 (Fla. 1957).
45. Ibid.
46. FLA.

STAT.

§,695.031(4) (1957).
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Recording.-The effect of a recorded but erroneously acknowledged
instrument was the crucial issue in Edenfield v. Winegard.7 In this case
one C. B. Edenfield executed a mortgage in favor of E. B, Edenfield; however the acknowledgment stated that E. B. Edenfield executed the mortgage.
The instrument was recorded and sometime later C. B. Edenfield executed
a second mortgage to the defendants. The defendants foreclosed their
mortgage without naming E. B. Edenfield as a defendant. The instant
suit was subsequently brought by E. B. Edenfield to foreclose the defendants'
interest in the land. The defendants contended that the mortgage of
E. B. Edenfield was improperly acknowledged, not recordable,48 and therefore, did not act as constructive notice.4 The majority of the court, denying
the application of this rule, held that there was no doubt that the person
who appeared before the notary was the person who executed the mortgage. 0
In keeping with the tendency to uphold acknowledgments wherever possible, the mistaken name would be considered merely a clerical error.
Thus, the court found substantial compliance with the recording statute
and the defendants were then charged with constructive notice of the
prior mortgage.5 1 The minority of the court felt that this was an instance
of the notary taking the acknowledgment of the wrong party-hence no
52
acknowledgment.
The extent to which one is charged with constructive notice through
recording was the principle issue in Chatlos v. McPhersen5 3 where the
competing titles had their origins in the famous "land boom" days. The
plaintiff, seeking to quiet title, based his claim on a prior deed which
was dated on December 16, 1925, but not recorded until December 15,
1927. In the interim between the date of the deed and the date of
recording, a judgment was recorded against the grantor and an execution
was issued. The execution resulted in a sheriff's deed which was recorded
on December 18, 1944, and it was through this deed that the defendant
claimed title.
It is not clear just when the sheriff's deed was issued, but this is
immaterial as the execution was levied before the recording of the prior
deed. The Florida recording act 4 protects creditors and subsequent pur47. 89 So.2d 776 (Fla. 1956).
48. FLA. STAT. § 695.03 (1955), requires proper acknowledgement in order to entitle the instrument to be recorded.
49. This rule is well established. Lassiter v. Curtis-Bright Co., 129 Fla. 728, 177
So.201 (1937); see Tiffany, Real Property, § 1264 (3rd Ed. 1939).
50. FLA. STAT. §95.90 (1957), requires the officer taking the acknowledgment
to obtain satisfactory proof that the person making it is the individual who is described
in, and who executed the instrument.
51. Edenfield v. Winegard, 89 So.2d 776 (Fla. 1956).
52. Id. at 779.
53. 95 So.2d 506 (Fla. 1957).
54. FLA. STAT. § 695.01 (1955). The statute in part reads: "No conveyance,
shall be good and effectual in law or equity against creditors or subsequent purchasers for
a valuable consideration and without notice, unless the same be recorded according to
law; ..
..
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chasers for value without, notice against prior unrecorded instruments.
Thus, under the facts stated this far, it is clear that the defendant should
prevail.
An additional factor not yet mentioned, however, was the fact that
prior to all of the aforementioned transactions, the grantor-debtor had the
particular lot released from a blanket mortgage. The plaintiff contended
that this partial release would put everyone on notice of an impending
sale (suggesting, apparently, at least an unrecorded contract in existence),
as "it is common knowledge" that a developer obtains a partial release for
the purpose of selling lots. The court wisely rejected this contention
which would require subsequent buyers to search "outside" the record
whenever a partial release of a blanket mortgage is found. 5
The case is sound. To constitute constructive notice of matters outside
the record, the record itself should make some reference to those matters.
A vendee can gain protection against possible interests' intervening between
the date of his contract and the date of closing by checking the records
up to the very instant of closing.50 He might also insist that the vendor
acknowledge the contract when made so that it can be recorded, 7 thus
preventing subsequent parties from gaining priority. Consistent with these
views, it was held in Poladian v. Johnson 5s that a "wild deed" executed
and recorded by one not in possession and whose only interest in the land
is an unrecorded contract to purchase, is not sufficient notice to defeat
a subsequent purchaser. The court stated that a purchaser is only expected
to exhaust the records and not to canvass the neighborhood to ascertain
if there are any outstanding claims.5 9
Reformation and cancellation.-Hedges v. Lysek 6° presented an interesting set of facts. D, the common grantor, was the owner of two
adjoining lots, Whiteacre and Blackaere. A small house was located near
the dividing line on Vhiteacre and Blackacre was unimproved. However
D presumed, as did all subsequent parties, that the house stood on Blackacre. D entered into agreements for deed with A for Whiteacre and B
55. See note,53 supra.
56. This, of course, is not easy. A foolproof method

is

to escrow the purchase money

until the deed can be recorded and the record checked to see that no one else has gained
priority. If the subsequent examination reveals that the grantor's title was still clear
when the deed was- delivered, then the purchase money is released and disbursed. To
protect the grantor in case the subsequent examination reveals intervening superior rights,
a quit claim deed back to the grantor may be "escrowed" with the money. In case intervening superior claims should arise, then the purchase money is returned to the grantee,
and the quit claim deed recorded. If the title is found good and the money disbursed,
the quit claim deed is returned to the purchaser and destroyed.
57. The instrument must be acknowledged to be entitled to recording. Generally,
vendors may not want contracts recorded because their title will be clouded if the proposed transactiou is not consummated.
58. 85 So.2d 140 (Fla. 1956).
59. Ibid.
60. 84 So.2d 28 (Fla. 1955).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XlI

for Blackacre. A then conveyed Whiteacre to the defendant and two days
later D conveyed Whiteacre to A. B then found a purchaser for Blackacre
and quit-claimed back to D who conveyed to the Plaintiff. The plaintiff
then discovered that the house was located on Whiteacre and sought
equitable relief in the following alternatives: (1) reform the deeds so
that the house will be on the plaintiff's lot; or (2) allow the plaintiff
to move the house onto Blackacre. The lower court held that by the
doctrine of "after acquired title" the defendant was the owner of the
house and lot and denied relief. The supreme court reversed, reasoning
that all the parties to the many transactions relied on the fact that
Whiteacre was unimproved and Blackacre was improved, and directed that
a decree be entered allowing the plaintiff to remove the house from Whiteacre and place it on Blackacre. 6'
In Cook Y. Adams"2 the court approved the cancellation of a deed
by the grantor for failure of consideration. The grantor, an aged woman,
conveyed property to the defendant while reserving a life estate for
herself. The consideration for this conveyance was that the defendants would
take care of the grantor. Upon a showing that the defendants had failed
to provide for the grantor, the deed was cancelled.
III.

ESTATES,

DowER,

HOMESTEAD AND FUTURE INTERESTS

Homestead: Legislation, special tax exemption.-Special tax relief is
accorded paraplegic veterans by completely exempting their homesteads from
taxation.08 Requirements of eligibility include: honorable discharge; service
connected disability; and special pecuniary assistance from the Veterans'
Administration because the disability requires specially adapted housing.0 4
Homestead conveyances, estate taxes, descent, exemption.-'Fhe effect
of an inter-familial homestead conveyance on estate taxes was considered
by the United States court of appeals in Nelson's Estate v. Commissioner. 5
The land in question, which had been conveyed by the deceased husband
to his wife, consisted of a citrus grove and a small tract of land upon
which the parties lived. The tax court held that the conveyance was
gratuitous and invalid. 6 Thus, the wife was allowed to claim only a life
estate in the property and was not allowed a marital deduction in computing the estate tax.67 In modifying the ruling, the court held that the
assistance rendered her husband in the management of the grove was
61. Ibid. This case may be compared with Voss v. Forgue, note 21 supra, and

Chavis v. Citizens Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n., note 23 supra,
62. 89 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1956).

63.

FLA. STAT. § 192.11ff (1957).
64. Id. subsection (
i).
65. 232 F.2d 720 (5th Cr. 19561.
66. Many Florida cases hold that gratuitous conveyances of the homestead are
invalid. See Bayer, Survey of Real Property, 10 MiAMi L.Q. 389, 398 (1956).
67. See 53 STAT. 123 (1939), 26 U.S. C. § 812 (1952).
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adequate consideration to support that conveyance, but that the household
services rendered were only those duties expected of "every rural housewife
who aids her husband." 68 The wife's contention that only her heirs have
the right to attack the conveyance was rejected, the court stating that
the commissioner has the right, as well as the duty, to seek any adjudication
under law which is essential for the protection of federal revenue legitimately
due. 69
In Florida cases involving homestead the court championed the rights
of the surviving spouse and gave the homestead provision the liberal interpretation which one has come to expect under such situations. In a question
regarding descent, the court held that an entire parcel which included, along
with a dwelling house, a one story cottage and a two story garage apartment (used for rental income), was to be regarded as homestead. 0 This is an
affirmation of the doctrine of Cowdery v. Herring," in which it was said
that the homestead provision was to "preserve as exempt a reasonable
portion of the homestead improvement, . . . when it appears that the
improvements concerned are being used as a means of making the owner's
72
livelihood."
The fact that the income producing portion of the homestead is temporarily abandoned will not remove its homestead character so as to make
it amenable to execution in satisfaction of a judgment lien according to
the rule of Olesky v. Nicholas.13 In this case the court repudiated the
argument that the constitution does not protect the homestead from
satisfaction of a judgment obtained for the commission of a malicious tort.
This protection of the constitution also extends to prevent the forced sale
of homestead property to satisfy a foreign judgment on a note which contained a waiver of homestead.?4 Such waiver is clearly against the public
policy of Florida and unenforceable.75
Taxation.-While it is well established law in other jurisdictions, the
Florida court for the first time announced in Gautier v. LapoI" that a
lessee, with an option to purchase, has no estate in the property, either
legal or equitable. This decision precludes a leaseholder, who exercised
his option after January 1, from claiming the homestead tax exemption"
since he was not the title holder at the beginning of the year, and his
after acquired title does not relate back to the date of executing the option
68. 232 F.2d 720, 724 (5th Cir. 1956).

69. Id. at 724.
70. Union Trust Co. v. Glunt, 85 So.2d 877 (Fla. 1956).

71, 106 Fla. 567, 143 So.433 (1932).
72. Id. at 569, 435.

73. 82 So.2d 510 (Fla. 1955).
74. Sherbill v.Miller Mfgr. Co., 89 So.2d 28 (Fla. 1956).
75. See also Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. Magwood, 107 Fla. 208, 145 So. 67
(19321. 91 So.2d 324
(Fla. 1956).
77. FP2. Const Art. X. § 7.
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contract. 8 The court distingushed "contracts of sale" wherein the vendee
is the equitable owner at the time of execution and the "lessee-option
contract" in which case the vendee is only a tenant until he exercises his
option.
Future Interests.-In Owenby v. Quincy0 the supreme court was
divided four to three as to whether there had been a breach of condition
in a fee simple determinable. Land was donated to the City of Quincy
for use as a "park, playground or other recreational purposes," and the city
was required to improve the property for such use within five years. Suit
was brought nine years later to recover the property alleging that the city
had done nothing except to place some fill on the property to correct a
drainage problem. The majority, reversing the .lower court, felt that this
improvement fell below that which was contemplated by the parties at
the time of the conveyance.8 0
The creation and termination of life estates were the subject of two
interesting cases. The first,81 a case of a careless scrivener, involved the
construction of a deed which purported to convey a fee simple in the
granting clause and only a life estate in the habendum clause. The court
held that the statute abolishing the necessity of words of limitation rendered
such words in the granting clause surplusage 2 and, therefore, the intent
of the grantor as expressed in the habendum clause would be controlling.
The second case involved a suit by the guardian of an incompetent, the
owner of a life estate, for rents and profits from the remainderman in possession, 83 The defense interposed by the remainderman was that the incompetency of the holder of the life estate terminated her interest and the
remainderman became the fee owner. The supreme court replied that
"A person sent to the state hospital is not to be considered as having died
hence having been divested of an interest in a life estate."' 4
Dower; legislation.-A new statute of limitations on the rights of a
widow to elect dower was enacted by adding subsection (3) to Florida
Statutes section 731.35.85 The new subsection provides that any dower
interest in realty will be barred unless the widow's written election is filed
within nine months after the first publication of notice to creditors or three
years after the death of her husband, whichever first occurs. 6 A significant
feature of the new provision is that such election must be filed and recorded
within the time limits specified in the office of the clerk of the circuit
78. Guatier v. Lapof, 91 So.2d 324 (Fla. 1956).
79. 95 So.2d 426 (Fla, 1957).
80. ibid.

81. Bronstien v. Bronstien, 83 So.2d 699 (Fla. 1955).
82. FLA. STAT. § 689.10 (1957.

83. Kany v. Becks, 85 So.2d 841 (Fla. 1956).
84. Id. at 845.
85. FLA. STAT. § 731.35 (3) (1957).

86. Ibid.
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court for the county wherein such realty is located.s7 The former provision, which is still retained,8 8 simply provides that the election must be
filed "within nine months after the publication of the first notice to creditors
in the office of the county judge in whose court the estate of the deceased
husband is being administerd." Thus, as to realty, such election now has to
be filed in both the county judge's court and the appropriate circuit court.
A saving provision of the new legislation provides that no such claim will
be barred if the written claim is filed prior to June 1, 1958. 9 The new
legislation should have a salutary effect on title marketability and reduce
the probability of purchasers having unexpected dower claims asserted
against their land.
In Estate of Payne,90 the court disallowed a set-off against an asset
of the estate of a deceased husband prior to the allotment of the widow's
dower. The court followed Murphy v.Murphy"' which held that assets in
which the widow has a dowable interest are not subject to any liability
which the deceased might have incurred, the estate being entirely liable
for the indebtedness. The court distinguished the case of Henderson v.
Usher. 2 In this latter case the deceased had purchased securities on margin
and had pledged them with the broker. Under the dower statute in effect
at that time a widow could claim dower in all property ponessed by her
husband at the time of his death. Being pledged, the securities were in the
possession of the broker and hence not subject to dower. The present
statute 3 allows the widow a dower interest in all property owned by the
deceased husband; therefore the Henderson case is not controlling. It may
be noted, however, that the present statute also provides ". . . .nothing
herein contained shall be construed as impairing the validity of the lien
of any duly recorded mortgage or the lien of any person in possession of
personal property."94

Murder.-Acquitted of the murder of her husband by reason of insanity,
a surviving widow did not lose her right to claim dower in her husband's
estate.9 1 The statutory bar which precludes a convicted murderer from
inheriting from his victim 98 was held not controlling since there was no
conviction of murder. The court further found no common law bar which
prevented her from exercising her dower right. The contention that the
acquittal in the criminal action would not be res judicata as to her criminal
87. Ibid. See Brooker, Dower: Fickle Dame of the Law, 32 Fla. B. J. 132 (1958).
88. FLA. STAT. § 731.35 (1) (1957).
89. FLA. STAT. § 731.35 (3) (1957).
90. 83 So.2d 109 (Fla. 1955).
91. 125 F12. 855, 170 So. 856 (1936).
92. 125 Fla. 709, 170 So. 846 (1936).
93. FLA. STAT. § 731.34 (1955).
94. Ibid.
95. Hill v. Morris, 85 So.2d 847 (Fla. 1956).
96. FLA. STAT. § 731.31 (1955).
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responsibility in the probate proceedings 7 was rejected. The court stated
that if she had been convicted in a criminal action she would have been
barred in the civil suit, so an acquittal should operate in the same fashion.
It is submitted that this agrument of res judicata is beside the point.
The decision is obviously one of policy. Clearly the statute barring a convicted murderer is not directly controlling. The widow was not convicted,
and she was not claiming inheritance, but dower. The policy behind that
statute, however, might have been used to defeat her claim. The cases
involving tenants by the entireties so indicate.s Dower has historically been
a favorite creature of the common law, and the instant case indicates that
it is still highly regarded by the Florida Supreme Court.
Cotenancies.-The application to bank accounts of real property estate
concepts provides a fruitful source of litigation. In Spark v. Canny,9 9 a
mother, eighty-three years old and in ill health, changed a sole bank
account approximately six months before her death into a "joint account
with the right of survivorship" between her and a daughter. The mother had
also made her three daughters principal legatees under her will, and there
was evidence that she intended for them to share equally in all of her
estate. In deciding that the three daughters were equally entitled to the
proceeds of the account, the court held that no joint tenancy with right
of survivofship was created because of a lack of donative intent.
The court recognized that as between the depositors and the bank a
survivorship account was created, but noted that such recognition would
not necessarily determine the status of the account in regard to the litigants
at bar. It was determined that the change in the account was made simply
for the convenience of the decedent to provide a practical means of withdrawing funds to pay her expenses, and not for the purpose of vesting any
beneficial interest in the other "joint tenant." The court observed that the
signature card would raise a presumption of a gift of the balance of the
fund on the death of its creator, but that such presumption could be
overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Apparently
such clear and convincing evidence was lacking in Colclazier v. Colclazier,10
97. Stevens v. Duke, 42 So.2d 361, 363 (Fla. 1949), holding that a judgment in
a criminal action is not res judicata in a civil action. Cf Carter vs. Carter, 88 So.2d 153
(Fla. 1956). In an action to recover as the beneficiary of her husband's insurance policy,
containing a clause prohibiting payment to one who feloniously kills the insured, the wife
was prohibited from pleading her acquittal in the criminal action.
98. There is a great disparity of results among the jurisdictions in these cases. See
comment Homicide-Effect on Wrongdoer's Inheritance, interstate and Survivorship

Rights, 7 Miami L.Q., 524, 528 (1953). Florida takes the intermediate position that
violent homicide of one contenant by the other destroys the tenancy by the entireties in
a manner similar to that of divorce, and such cotenant is treated as a tenant in common.
The wrongdoer thus neither gains nor loses by his wrongful act. The rule applies although
the slaying cotenant is not convicted of murder. See Ashwood v. Patterson, 49 So.2d
848 (Fla. 1951), where the killer committed suicide. The rule was applied. See also
Boyer, Survey of Real Property Law, 8 MIAMI L. Q. 389, 403-404 (1954).
99. 88 So.2d 307 (Fla. 1956).
100. 89 So.2d 261 (Fla. 1956).

REAL PROPERTY
where the court recognized the claim of the widow, as a surviving tenant
by the entireties, to the balance of a joint account.
The cases add to the perplexities of attorneys in advising clients as
to their rights arising out of similar funds. While giving presumptive effect
to the signature cards, the court nevertheless makes it clear that the
signature cards are not the sole criteria in esablishing the right of the survivor
to the balance of such accounts. In this manner the reliability of such
accounts in accomplishing the apparent objective of the depositor is
weakened. On the other hand, however, no injustice is done in cases of
this kind in inquiring into the real intent of the parties to the transaction.
The balance of the fund is on hand, and the rights of the claimants
can be seasonably ascertained. If in fact the parties intend to create a
genuine survivorship account, that intention will be recognized; but if
in fact no such result is intended, the real intent of the parties will be
effected.
The problem of tracing withdrawals from an alleged bank account
tenancy by the entireties was twice considered by the supreme court.
In re Estate of Lyons,"' decedent had opened two accounts in the joint
names of himself and wife. Later, he withdrew the funds from one account
to open a third in his sole name, and he also had his wife's name removed
from the signature card of the second account. After the death of the
husband the wife sought to trace the funds of both accounts so that she
could claim the proceeds as the survivor of an estate by the entireties. In
denying the survivor's claim, the court held that the signature cards alone
were not sufficient indicia of an intent to own the accounts by the
entireties. 0 2 The decision followed an earlier one which recognized bank
accounts by the entireties but cautioned that "Such implication (of
an intention to create an estate by the entireties) may not, for obvious
reasons, be indulged where a bank account or bonds simply payable to a
man or his wife are concerned."'' 03 In Winters v.Parks,104 involving a widow
who was seeking to trace funds withdrawn from a joint bank account to
purchase realty, the court reached a similar result.
The decision denying relief to the widow is sound, but these cases
seem to raise as many questions as they solve. It will be noted that the
unarticulated assumption of both cases seems to be that tracing would
be allowed if there had been shown a clear intent to create a tenancy by
the entireties. Thus, there would seem to be an open invitation for survivors
to attempt a tracing of former depleted accounts.
101. 90 So.2d 39 (Fla. 1956).
for the payment of the proceeds to the survivor of the joint account, but it does not
specify that any particular estate is created.

102. See F"t. STAT. § 659.29 (1955). This statute exempts the banks from liability
103. Bailey v. Smith, 89 Fla. 303, 103 So. 833 (1925).
104. 91 So.2d 649 (Fla. 1956).
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The concept of a tenancy by the entireties in bank accounts is anomolous
as there is no joint seisin, in fact no seisin at all, and no joint control
as in the corresponding estate in real property."' Since either party
normally can withdraw funds from the account, it differs radically from
the similar real property interest where one of the parties is unable singly
to convey even his own interest. 10 1lence, if the court desires to adhere
to former decisions recognizing such estate or interest in bank accounts,
it should authoritatively establish the characteristics. Assuming an intent
to establish a survivorship account in the first instance, a logical position
would be that either party, subject to contrary agreement between them,
can withdraw or deposit funds, or even terminate the account completely,
and dispose of the corpus, but that on the death of one, the survivor
is entitled to the balance. This result probably conforms to the actual
intent of the parties in similar cases and is not without authority. 07 No
tracing of withdrawals should be allowed except, possibly, where it is
determined that no beneficial interest whatever was intended for the
co-depositor and he withdrew funds.
In a case of first impression, 0 8 it was held, contrary to holdings in
some jurisdictions,109 that a surviving widow of an estate by the entireties
is not entitled to contribution from the estate of her deceased husband
for one half the unpaid balance on a purchase money mortgage. The
rationale supporting this view was: (1) the widow and deceased each
owned the whole estate and consequently the whole obligation, the death
of either neither enlarging the one's estate nor the debt of the other; and
(2) the personal estate of the deceased would not benefit by contributing
to the debt, and to make it do so would be inequitable." 0
Partition: Legislation.- The partition statute relating to costs was
amended to provide that the interested parties should pay the cost of
defendant's attorney as well as the plaintiff's, such costs to be com105. These survivorship bank account cases are exhaustively analyzed in Brooker,
Survivorship in Joint Bank Accounts, 31. Pla. B. J. 183 (1957). See note 10 MIAMI L.Q.
116 (1955), concerning the Lyons case and containing a general analysis.
106. Cooper v. Maynard, 156 Fla. 534, 23 So.2d 734 (1945); Straus vs. Straus, 148
Fla. 23, 25, 3 So.2d 727 (1941); Anderson v. Truernan, 100 Fla. 727, 732, 130 So. 12
(1930): Mailey v. Smith, 89 Fla. 303, 306, 103 So. 833 (1925).
107. Crawford v. McGraw, 61 So.2d 484 (Fla. 1952), Malone v. Walsh, 315 Mass.
484, 53 N.E. 2d 126 (1944), both involving joint tenancies with the right of survivorship; Seymour v. Seymour, 85 So.2d 726 (Fla. 1956), Matter of Totten, 179 N.Y. 112,
71 N.E. 748 (1904), both involving "Totten" trusts. In Ohio where neither tenancies
by the entireties nor joint tenancies with the right of survivorship are recognized, survivorship rights may be acquired by contract. See Sage v. Flueck, 132 Ohio St. 377, 7 N.E.
2d 802 (1937); note 6 Ohio St. L. J. 191 (1950); Osro REv. CODE SEP. § 1105.09
(Baldwin 1953).
108. Lopez v. Lopez, 90 So.2d 456 (Mia. 1956).
109. Cunningham v. Cunninghom, 158 Md. 372, 148 Atl. 444 (1930); In re
Dowler's Estate, 368 Pa. 519, 84 A.2d 209 (1951); In re Kershaw's Estate, 352 Pa.
205, 42. A.2d 538 (1945).
110. The case is noted in 11 MMamJ L.Q. 526 (1957).

REAL PROPERTY

mensurate with the service rendered and to be determined on equitable
1
principles at the discretion of the court.
That the right to partition may be waived was affirmed in Condrey
v. Condrey." 2 In this case the parents, through a straw conveyance, created
a tenancy in common with their son and daughter-in-law in consideration
of the son's promise of support. In a partition suit brought by the son, the
parents' defense was an oral agreement not to partition. The oral agree.
ment was held removed from the Statute of Frauds because the parents'
consideration had been fully executed by the conveyance of the property
and the creation of the estate. The court added that partition should be
denied if such relief would be clearly' inequitable or result in fraud.
The ownership of property by a man and woman not ceremonially
married again required the supreme court to determine its proper disposition
after the death of the parties."13 The decision, partly denying the claim of
the "wife's" administrator: (1) found insufficient proof that property was
purchased with funds of the woman, and refused to impress a constructive
trust on individually held property; (2) similarly found insufficient proof
of a joint venture; and (3) finding insufficient evidence of a common law
marriage, thus precluding an estate by the entireties, decreed that jointly
held property was owned as tenants in common and should be equally
divided."'
IV.

RIGrHTs IN LAND

Legislation: water law. - The creation of administrative control over
many of Florida's water problems is one of the most significant property
enactments during the past biennium."1 5 Henceforth, the major responsibility
for the systematic development, conservation and allocation of water resources will be vested in the Department of Water Resources and the State
Board of Conservation. Thus, it can be expected that a more orderly and
rational settlement of water disputes will result. Decisions will be made
by experts viewing the problem on a state or regional basis rather than
on the traditional judicial level which considers primarily, if not exclusively,
only the rights of the litigants before the court. Existing common law
riparian and other rights are preserved, however. 118
The Department of Water Resources was created in 1957 after an
extensive study by, and on the recommendation of, the Water Resources
111. FLA. STAT. § 66.08 (1957).
112. 92 So.Zd 423 (Fla. 1957).
113. Cannova v. Can-an, 92 So.2d 614 (Fla. 1957). Similar cases can be found in
Boyer, Survey of Real Property, 8 MIAMI L.Q. 389, 404 (1954).
114. Cannova v. Carran, see note 113 supra.
115. Fla. Stat. §§ 373.071-373.251 (1957). See Maloney, Florida's New Water
Resources Law, 10 U. or FLA. L. REv. 119 (1957); Maloney and Plager, Floridas
Streans.-Water Rights In A Water Wonderland, 10 U. oF FLA. L. R. 51. 294 (1957).
116. FLA. STAT. § 373.101 (1957).
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Study Commission. This Commission was created in 1955.117 As viewed
by the Study Commission, the solution to Florida's water problems required
three steps: "First, insure that legal authorization exists for the capture,
storage, and use of water in excess of reasonable uses; second, authorize
the diversion of such water beyond riparian or overlying land; and, third,
provide means of restricting unreasonable withdrawals of water in areas
where such withdrawals exceed the natural replenishment of such waters,
or where such withdrawals exceed or threaten to exceed the natural replenishment of such waters, or where such withdrawals render the waters unfit for
use by reason of salt water intrusion or other causes.,"11 The act creating
the Department of Water Resources provides for all three measures.
The purpose of the act as expressed therein is to effect "the maximum
beneficial utilization, development and conservation of the water resources
of the state in the best interest of all its people and to prevent the waste
and unreasonable use of said resources."" 9 However, "the present property
rights of persons owning land and exercising existing water rights appertaining thereto shall be respected and such rights shall not be restricted
without due process of law nor divested without payment of just compensation; and there shall be no authorization to divert water from springs
(or downstream therefrom), now developed and operated for recreational
purposes or as tourist attractions, to a degree that will materially interfere
with such use." 120
The Department is generally empowered to accomplish the purposes
of the act with the supervision and approval of the State Board of Conservation, and to that end the Department is given broad powers of conducting research and study and of compiling statistics.121 The Board, on
the other hand, is given the following general powers and duties:
To authorize the capture, storage and use of water of any
watercourse only in excess of average minimum flow at the point
of capture; to authorize the capture, storage and use of water
of any lake only in excess of average minimum level; to authorize
the capture, storage and use of ground water only in excess of
average minimum elevation at the point of capture; and to authorize
the diversion of such waters beyond riparian or overlying land;
provided that such capture, storage, use or diversion of water from
a surface or ground water source will not interfere with the reasonable uses existing at the122time of the beginning of the capture,
storage, use or diversons.
117. Laws of Fla., c. 29748 (1955).
118. Fla. Water Resources Study Gornm'n, Florida Water Resources, a Report to
the Governor and the 1957 Legislature, 15 (1956).
119. FLA. STAT. § 373.101 (1957).
120. Ibid.
121. FLA. SrAT. §§ 373.111, 373.131 (1957).
122. FLA. STAT. § 373.141 (1957).
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Thus, in essence, existing common law rights as to streams or lakes,
unchanneled surface waters and percolating or underground waters are
preserved. It is clear, however, that (except as to existing reasonable uses),
the legislation envisions no common law rights to flood waters, or any
other surplus waters, surface or underground, in excess of average minimum
level or elevation. The act in effect declares that these surplus waters can
be captured, stored; and used by the state, even to the extent of being
diverted from riparian or other land from which they are captured, to
the best interest of the people as a whole.
The philosophy of the new law that there is no common law right
of the landowner to excess waters is generally in accord with the dictum
of the Florida Supreme Court in Tilden v. Smith,"23 wherein the court
stated:
Flood waters which are of no substantial benefit to a riparian
owner or to his land, and are not used by him, may be appropriated
by any person who can lawfully gain access to the stream, and
may be conducted to land not riparian, and even beyond the watershed of the stream, without the consent of the riparian owner
and without compensation to him. But where the water in question,
although in a sense high water or flood water, is nevertheless a
part of the regular and usual flow of the stream for a considerable
period of each year, and at a time when such flow is of substantial
use and benefit to the riparian lands, or the flow of such water
in its accustomed place is necessary to the gathering of water in
subterranean strata from which the owners of the underlying lands
are entitled to take it, there is no right of1 4appropriation for nonriparian use as against the riparian owners.
It would appear that the common law right of anyone to take these
excess waters, in view of all the limiting factors announced in the decision,
is a most tenuous one. Clearly, provision for capture of such waters by
the state and subsequent use thereby is desirable and much more practicable.
It is to be hoped that the limiting factors expressed in Tilden v. Smith"23
will generally not be regarded as vesting common law rights in any surface
owner to flood or surplus waters so as to restrict the power of the state
under this new legislation.
It may be noted that the Board of Conservation is a management
rather than an operating agency. It is not empowered to build the necessary
dams, canals or other works for the capture, storage or diversion of excess
waters. Instead, it grants such authorization to individuals or groups who
must supply the necessary physical facilities. 126 The Board is specifically
123. 94 Fla. 502, 113 So. 708 (1927).
124. Id.at 510-511, 113 So. at 711.
125. See note 123 supra.
126. Maloney, Florida's New Water Resources Law, 10 U. or
138 (1957).
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empowered to so authorize any legally constituted water management
district. 7 Such districts generally have the advantage of taxation or assessment powers whereas the Board does not.'28
The 1957 legislature also provided a method for the erection of structures in state owned navigable and non-navigable streams for the capture
and diversion of the water. 2" Riparian owners an grantees of easements from
riparian owners may obtain this authority from the Trustees of the Internal
Improvement Fund. Hence, in these situations, applicants must obtain a
permit from the State Board to divert the water, and another from the
Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund for the erection of the
structure.130 Of course, both boards have the same membership since they
are both ex officio bodies consisting of members of the state cabinet.13'
Legislation; submerged lands.-Significant changes have also been
enacted by the 1957 legislature relative to the title and disposition of submerged lands within the state. Section 253.12 of the Florida Statutes was
amended to provide administrative and detailed procedure for the disposition
of submerged sovereignty tidal and bottom lands. 2 The basic policy is
retained that the title to such lands is vested in the Trustees of the
Internal Improvement Fund, 8 but the method of disposition is altered.
By former legislation dating from 1856, 34 the state granted the title
to such lands to the riparian owners and gave them the right to bulkhead
and fill in their land to the edge of the channel.'8 Although the statute
appeared to vest the title automatically in the riparian owners, it was
decided that such grant was provisional and conditioned upon the riparian
owners' compliance with the statute. 36 Until the owners actually filled
the land it was subject to reversion to the state at any time."s7 This legislation is expressly repealed by the new act," 8 but titles previously acquired
by the upland owners under former provisions are confirmed.'3 9
127. FLA. STAT. § 373.141 (1) (b) 1957).
128. See note 126 supra at 138.
129. FLA, STAT. § 271.10 (1957).
130. See note 126 supra at 146.
131. Ibid.
132. FLA. STAr. § 253.12, 253.122 to 253.19 and 253.0013 (1957).
133. FLA. STAT. § 253.12 (1957). Cf. FLA. STAT. § 253.12 (1955).
134. Fla. Gen. Laws c. 791 (1856). The legislation was extended in 1921 by the
"Butler Bill," Laws of Fla. c.8537 (1922); FLA. STAT. §§ 271.01 to 271.09 (1955).
135. FLA. STAT.

§

271.01

(1955).

This statute and others were significant in

Trustee of the Internal Improvement Fund v. Claughton, see note 145 infra.
136. State v. Black River Phosphate Co., 32 Fla. 82, 13 So. 640 (1893). See also
Panama Ice and Fish Co. v. Atlantic and State A. B. Ry., 71 Fla. 419, 71 So. 606 (1916);
Duval Engineering and Contracting Co. v. Sales, 77 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1955); Hunt,
Riparian Rights in Florida, 8 U. oF FLA. L. REV. 393, 398-404 (1955).
137. Holland v. Fort Pierce Financing and Construction Co,, 157 Fla, 649, 27 So.2d
76 (1946); Trumbull v. McIntosh, 103 FIa. 708, 138 So. 34 (1931); Commodores Point
Terminal Co. v. Hudnall, 283 Fed. 150 (S.D. Fla. 1922).
138. Laws of Fla. c 57-362, sec. 9 (1957).
139. FLA. STAT. §§ 253.129 and 253.0013 (1958).
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Under the new legislation the Trustees of the Internal Improvement
Fund may convey affected submerged lands and grant permits for their
filling and development after due application, notice and hearing. 140 All
land between the high water mark and the bulkhead line as established in
accordance with other provisions of the act may be conveyed only to the
upland owner. 1
Additional sections are added to chapter 253 of the Florida Statutes.
These sections authorize counties and municipalities with the approval of
the Internal Improvement Fund to establish bulkhead lines offshore from
existing lands and islands.' 42 Administrative procedures for establishing such
lines and for obtaining permits for filling to the bulkhead lines are also
added. It is further provided that the lands shall not be filled beyond
bulkhead lines as such expansion "shall be deemed an interference with
the servitude of commerce and navigation . . ."14 Generally, existing rights
are preserved and a number of exceptions are provided.' 44 On the whole,
the legislation appears to be a pragmatic and sensible solution to a problem
of increasing importance. Instead of a carte blanche grant by legislative
fiat to upland owners irrespective of the size of the land and the effect
on the public as a whole, the administrative determination in each instance
of the proper dividing line between public and private interests may be
expected to result in fair decisions and an orderly development of Florida's
vast waterfront lands.
The title to submerged lands and the right of an island owner to
bulkhead and fill were the critical issues in Trustees of the Internal Improve45 The case reviewed
ment Fund v. Claughton.1
at length the history of the
island, tracing its development from an original five acre tract, to its
present size of twenty and seven-tenths" acres, and to its proposed size of
more than seventy acres if the right of the owner to further fill were recognized. The history, scope and relationship of all the applicable legislative
acts, in addition to priniciples of estoppel, were utilized in arriving at
the conclusion that the present owners were entitled to the twenty and
seven-tenths acres but not entitled to expand the boundaries. The case
should be consulted for detailed analysis and study.
Beach erosion; pollution. The Trustees of the Internal Improvement
Fund are designated the erosion agency of the state 4" and are authorized
to establish and maintain a department of beach and shore erosion.1 47 The
Trustees are also authorized to make rules and regulations for the investiga§ 253.12 (1957).

140.

FLA. STAT.

141,
142.
143.
144.
145.

Ibid.
FLA. STAT. §
Id.§ 253.122
Id. §§ 253.12
86 So.2d 775

253.122 (1957).
(1)(1957).
(1), 253. 126 and 253.129 (1957).
(Fla. 1956).
146. FLA. STAT. § 253.65 (1) (1957).
147. ld.
§ 253.65 (2).
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tion of erosion conditions along Florida shores, 48 and to perform the
functions (also enumerated in the statute), 4 9 of the department of beach
and shore erosion in case no such department is created.' A section is
added to chapter 387 of the Florida Statutes relating to water pollution
to provide the remedy of injunction to restrain violations of the chapter,
and the sovereign immunity of the state is waived permitting suit in the
event any temporary injunction or restraining order is issued without
requiring bond, or is otherwise improperly, erroneously or improvidently
granted."
Covenants and easerents.-A partial review of the principles of privity
of estate and equitable servitudes was prompted by a remote grantee's
attempt to cancel certain restrictive covenants which were part of a general
development scheme. 5 2 Privity of estate was not in issue since the action
was in equity and not at law. However, the court, by way of dictum,
approved the Clark concept of privity of estate, 153 and quoted his criticism
of the other 54 two views as being "supported neither by ancient law nor
modern policy." The grantee having taken title with both actual and
constructive notice of the restrictions, and there being no change in the
character of the neighborhood, the equitable servitudes will be enforced
against him regardless of privity of estate technicalities.
Affirmative relief in the form of cancellation of restricted covenants
because of an alleged change in the neighborhood was denied in Wahrendorff
v. Moore.' The case presents an interesting problem of interpretation
because the covenants provided for both restriction on use to single family
residences and for the applicability of zoning regulations (the parcel in
controversy having been rezoned for business purposes)."( The effect of
rezoning was considered evidence of a change in the neighborhood but
148. Id. § 253.65 (t1)
149. 1d. § 253.65 (3).
150. Id.§ 253.65 (4).

FLA. STAT. § 387.10 (1) (1957).
152. Vetzel v. Brown, 86 So.2d 138 (Fla. 1956).
153. Clark, Covenants and Interests Running With Land Ill (2d Ed. 1947).

151.

"Succession to the estate of one of the parties to the covenant" is all that is required

under this view.

154. See Wheeler v. Schad, 7 Nev. 204 (1871), requiring also a succession of estate

between the covenantor and covenantee at the time the covenant is made, and Morse
v. Aldrich, 19 Pick. 449 (Mass. 1837), requiring the parties to the covenant to have

a mutual and simultaneous interest in the same land.
155. 93 So.2d 720 (Fla. 1957). That the principle of changed circumstances is
available not only defensively but also affirmatively is well established in Florida. Osius
v. Barton, 109 Fla. 556, 147 So. 862, 88 A.L.R. 394 (1933), and 129 Fla. 184, 176
So. 65 (1937); Barton v. Moline Properties, 121 Fla. lla. 683, 164 So. 551, 103 A.L.R.
725 (1935); Edgewater Beach Hotel v. Bishop, 120 Fla. 623, 163 So. 214 (1935); Dade
County v. Thompson, 146 Fla. 66, 200 So. 212 (1941).
156. See note 152 supra, the land in controversy was also zoned for business purposes,
but the court did not discuss the effect of such zoning regulation. In Tolar v. Meyer, 96
So.2d 554 (Fla. 1957), the covenant was also upheld in spite of a more lenient zoning
regulation.

1958]

REAL PROPERTY

not conclusive, and the chancellor's determination of the covenant's applicability upheld. As to the conflict between the covenant and zoning, the
court concluded that the terms of the conditions themselves indicated that
57
the more restrictive requirements should prevail. A dissenting opinion
was to the effect that although normally the more restrictive of the twozoning regulations or covenants-would prevail, that rule should not apply
here because the agreement as to zoning was itself a covenant, and a proper
interpretation, along with the general principle of favoring unrestricted
use, should give the zoning regulation priority.
In Grentner v. Le Jeune Auto 'heatre' 8 the unreasonable use of
certain light by the defendant, a used car dealer, which resulted in a breach of
the covenant not to make any use of the property which would be objectionable to the plaintiff's adjacent "drive in," was enjoined. In so holding the
court reiterated its position in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Watson.1" A "sale"
by the county commissioners of a "useless easement"'160 was held not
violative of the statute"" requiring competitive bids because the county's
interest was deemed infinitesimal.
Water rights.-In Kock v. Wick'"" the right of a city-lessee of a
narrow strip of land contiguous to appellants' property-to draw off percolating waters for sale to the public was restricted. A municipality as such
gets no additional rights to percolating waters, and, therefore, like an
individual lessee or owner, is only entitled to make a "reasonable use" of

the percolating waters. In Hayes v. Bownan'6 3 it was decided that an
upland riparian owner, whose property abuts navigable waters, is entitled
to have his riparian rights, including those of unobstructed view and access
to the channel, preserved over an area "as near as practicable" (but not
necessarily at right angles as claimed by the owner), in the direction of
the channel. The application of this rule will necessitate the resolution of
each individual controversy upon its own particular facts rather than on any
predetermined geometric formula based upon the angle of projection of
the boundary lines of the upland owner's lot. In addition certain Florida

4

157. Wahrendorff v. Moore, 93 So.2d 720, 723 (Fla. 1957).

158. 85 So.2d 238 (Fli. 1956).

159. 65 So.2d 732 (Fla. 1953). "While covenants restraining the free use of real
property are not favored . . .public policy . . . favors the fullest liberty of contract
and the widest latitude possible in the distribution of one's property . . . so long as the
restraint is within reasonable grounds."
160. Trv. Enterprises v. Atlantic Island Civic Ass'n., 90 So.2d 607 (Fla. 1956). A
prior decree had enjoined the use of the easement by the county, and had restricted its
use to specific property owners.
161. FrA. STAT. § 125.35 (1957).
162. 87 So.2d 47 (Fla. 1956).
163. 91 So2d 795 (Fl2. 1957). The case may also be noted for the doleful obsen'ation that a view of the "bright white tower of Stetson Law School which shines as a
beacon of learning on the eastern horizon" is not one of plaintiff's riparian rights. Id.
at 801.
164. FLA. STAT. §§ 253.12 to 253.15, 271.01, 271.07 to 271.09 (1955), and others.
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statutes pertaining to submerged lands were discussed, but some of these
were modified by the 1957 legislature."65
The determination of what rights are included in the term "riparian
rights" perplexed the supreme court. Title to the bottom of navigable lakes
being in the state, a riparian owner (in the absence of statute),1 05 has no
right to dredge soil from the bottom of the lake in order to add a peninsula
to his land abutting the lake.0 7 A riparian owner whose land abuts a small
arm of a large navigable lake, however, has a right of ingress and egress
to the main body of the lake, and this right may not be infringed by the
State Road Department. 8 5
Navigable waters.-A body of water to be considered navigable in
Florida must be "permanent in character, of sufficient size and so situated
that it may be used for purposes common or useful to the public in the

locality."'1 9 A non-navigable inland lake may be privately owned; and if

so owned a county is unable to secure any rights to fish or boat thereon
under the guise of a condemnation for a public purpose.'7 0
V.

SPECIAL TITLES

Legislation.-The Board of County Commissioners is authorized and
empowered to convey to the record fee simple owners without further
public notice and without consideration in those instances where land,
formerly acquired by the county for delinquent taxes, was sold under the
provisions of section 194.47 of the Florida Statutes and the former tax deed
was invalid because the purchaser, or one of the purchasers, was the clerk
of the circuit court of the county conducting the sale.' 7 ' Under an amend,nent to the statute regulating proceedings of eminent domain, the defen-

dant may also recover damages to his remaining adjoining property. 7 2

165. See notes 132-145 supra.
166. FLA. STAT. § 271.01 (1957), granted certain submerged land to upland owners.
This statute was repealed in 1957; see note 138 supra.
167. McDowell v. Trustees of Internal Improvement Fund, 90 So.2d 715 (Fla.
1956).
168. Webb v. Giddens, 82 So.2d 743 (Fla. 1955).
169. Baker v. State, 87 So.2d 497, 498 (Fla. 1956). The United States Supreme
Court's definition of 'navigable" is quoted with approval by the Florida court:
"That navigability in fact is the test of navigability in law, and that whether
a river is navigable in fact is to be determined by inquiring whether it is
used in its natural and ordinary condition as a highway for commerce, over
which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of
trade and travel on water."
Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574 (1922).
See also Maloney and Plager, Florida'sStreams-Water Rights In A Water Wonderland, 10 U. oF FLA. L. REv. 294, 309 (1957).
170. Osceola County v. Triple E Development Co., 90 So.2d 600 (Fla. 1956).
171. FLA. STAT. § 194.601 (1957).
172. FLA. STAT. § 73.10 (1957).
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Adverse possession.-In Levering v. Tarpon Springs'" a municipality
failed in its attempt to acquire title by adverse possession to that portion
of the defendant's land upon which it mistakenly constructed a waterworks
in 1924. The city's actions in assessing and collecting taxes on the land,
and its publishing an official map showing the defendant's lot to be free
of any encroachments of the water works were held to be completely and
totally inconsistent with any hostile or adverse claim of ownership.
A person who takes possession of a tract of land apparently believing
it to be a gift, when in fact no gift is intended, is a parol licensee and not
a parol donee. Consequently, he is a permissive user and regardless of how
long he remains, or how many improvements he makes, his interest cannot
ripen into title. 7 4 Similarly, when possession is obtained in a fiduciary
capacity (as agent), the unauthorized issuance of a deed to the fiduciary
(by the principal's wife), cannot transform the agent into an adverse
possessor."75
In Van Meter v. Kelsey," 80 involving a disputed boundary, the chancellor's finding that there was insufficient evidence of adverse possession
was approved. The doctrine of acquiesence 17T was also held inapplicable
because there was insufficient evidence that the fence was agreed upon
as the boundary between the two properties; and the fact that original
entries were made under an earlier survey did not control. Under these facts,
where the parties actually accept patents under the second survey and
receive a full quota of land, although the boundary may differ, apparently,
and justly so, the rule that the first survey controls 178 is inapplicable.
Tax deeds.-In Newmons v. Lake Worth Drainage District"9 the
supreme court considered the applicability of the four year tax deed statute
titles. It was specifically held that this
of limitations' 80 to "Murphy"''
statute of limitations has no application, as the grantee of a "Murphy" tax
deed gets an absolute and indefeasible title as of the effective date of the
82
deed.1
The limitations statute 83 in question, second 196.06 of the Florida
Statutes, has alternative provisions. It provides (1) a bar to an action
against the tax title, holder who goes into possession and remains for
four years; and (2) a bar to an action by the tax title holder who fails
173. 92 So.2d 638 (Fla. 1957).
174. McKinnon v.Commerford, 88 So.2d 753 (Fla. 1956).
175. Stephens v.Stephens, 94 So.2d 366 (Fla. 1957).
176. 91 So.2d 327 (Fla. 1956).
177. Id. at 330. See Boyer, Survey of Real Property Law, 8 MIAMi L.Q. 389, 419
(1954), for a discussion of the doctrine.
178. Id, at 332, Boyer at 402 for a discussion of the doctrine.
179. 87 So.2d 49 (Fla. 1956).
180. FLA. STAT. § 196.06 (1957).
181. Laws of Fla., c.18296 (1937).
182. Newmons v.Lake Worth Drainage Dist., 87 So.2d 49 (Fla. 1956).
183. Ibid.
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to get possession within four years of his tax title, thus allowing the land
to remain in the adverse possession of another. In the Newmons case
the grantee of the "Murphy" deed apparently neglected to gain possession
of the land until after four years had elapsed. It was held that the four
year statute of limitations was no bar to the action, that the aforesaid
statute applies only to tax titles acquired under the provisions of chapter
194,184 and that the provisions of that chapter and of the "Murphy" legislation are mutually exclusive. 185
The same four year statute of limitations, its relationship to adverse
possession generally, and the effect of a merger title were significant issues
in Gates v. Roberts.180 In this case the former owners of the land' 87
repurchased the original tract from the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund in 1941. In the meantime the defendants in 1939 had gone
into adverse possession when they commenced to farm the plaintiff's land
along with their own. Plaintiffs instituted suit in 1953 to recover possession
of the land, and the defendants relied on the four year statute of limitations
applicable to tax title holders.'8 8 The defendants probably could not have
prevailed under general adverse possession statutes' 89 as they were adverse
possessors without color of title and probably did not pay the taxes. 9 0 .
It was held under the particular facts of this case that the four year
statute of limitations was no bar.' 9" Although apparently assuming the
statute would normally bar a tax title holder under similar circumstances,
the court held it has no such effect where the former owner is the tax
certifiicate holder. In such cases, contrary to the usual situation of a tax
title constituting a new and original title, the reacquisition simply operates
as a payment of taxes by the former owner, his two titles merging into
one.' 92 Hence, the defendant adverse possessors can rely only on the general
93
statutes of limitation and not the special one relating to tax titles.1
The case does not specifically state whether the former owner is
claiming under a "Murphy" or other type of tax deed, but the rationale
seems broad enough to cover both situations. If, however, as appears likely,
a "Murphy" deed was involved," the court could have reached the same
184. FLA. STAT. § 194.01 (1955).
185. See note 182 supra.
186. 85 So.2d 862 (Fla. 1956).
187. They had of course, lost it for non-payment of taxes.
188. FLA. STAT. § 196.06 (1957).
189. FIA. STAT. §§ 95.12-95.20 (1957).
190. FLA. STAT, §§ 95.18-95.19 (1957), require the payment of taxes for adverse
possession without color of title.
191. Gates v. Roberts 85 So.2d 862 (Fla. 1956).
192. Ibid.
193. Ibid.
194. The repurchase was in 1941, two years after the title to delinquent land became
vested in the state. Former owners were given ten years to redeem homestead land under
the provisions of the original act. FLA. STAT. § 192.36 (1957), and since then a
provision has been added specifically authorizing resale to former owners. (FLA. STAT.
§ 192.381 (1953).
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result on the basis of the Newnions case which held that the four year
statute of limitations is not applicable to this type of tax deed. 15 The court,
instead, discussed the owner's right to redeem before the state actually issues
a tax deed to another purchaser, and states that this right of redemption is
more than an equity. 0 ' Further, the fact that the title may be new and
independent, so far as claims by former owners adverse to the new title
are concerned, is held not to prevent a merger title for purposes of bolstering, reinstating, or restoring continuity where no intervening rights have
19 7
become vested or accrued.
The case in point seems to reach a fair and just result. No rights of
innocent third parties have intervened, and there are no special equities
on behalf of the defendants. The doctrine of merger of title is already
well established in Florida jurisprudence, hence the case should not unduly
add to the burden of the title examiner. Such examiner must remember,
however, that he cannot rely on the four year statute of limitations when
either a "Murphy" or merger title is involved.
In another case is was held that when a tax deed has been on record
for more than twenty years, the taxes having been paid and no adverse
claim asserted, the title of the grantee is indefeasible. 9 s
Two cases concerned the statutory requirements relative to the
sufficiency of notice prior to the issuance of tax deeds. The statutes require
that notice of application for a tax deed must be published in a newspaper
in the county in which the property is located.199 A newspaper qualifies if
it is one of general circulation.20 0 In construing this requirement it was held
that as to county tax deeds, as distinguished from muncipal, a newspaper
qualifies although its principal readers are of a particular segment of the
population or of a particular area in the county.20 1 Other statutory requirements include publication continuously for one year prior to the date
the notice was carried;20 2 at least one year's entitlement to second class
mailing privileges;23 and publication on the same day each week for four
consecutive weeks.20 4 In interpreting this last requirement it was held that
the first publication be at least twenty-eight days prior to sale day, thus
allowing a sale on the twenty-ninth day, rather than requiring a period

195. See note 179 supra and the discussion applicable thereto. Note, however, that

the opinion of the Newmons case, propounded on a rehearing, was published after Cates
v. Roberts, but a per curiam decision had been reached earlier.

196. Gates v. Roberts,

197. Ibid.

85 So.2d 862, 864 (Fla. 1956).

198. Bladwin Co. v. Blaisdell, 82 So.2d 587 (Fla. 1955).
199. FA. STAT. § 194.16 (1957).
200. FLA. STAT. § 49.01 (1957).
201. Johnson v. Taggart, 92 So.2d 606 (Fla. 1957).
202. FLA. STAT. § 409.03 (1957).
203. Ibid.
204. See note 199 snpra.
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of twenty-eight days between the first notice and sale day which would
preclude a sale before the thirtieth day. 0 5
Eminent doman.-An interesting case 20 1 concerning condemnation involved the rights of both an owner and optionee. Since the purpose of an
eminent domain proceeding is to ascertain the value of the land condemned, and not the title thereto, it was held that questions as to the
extent of each individual's interest may be settled in subsequent summary
supplementary proceedings. Consequently, the optionee was not denied
"due process" by the trial court's refusal to allow the jury to return separate
verdicts. Moreover, the option, not having attained the status of a mutually
binding contract due to the failure of the optionee to exercise it prior to
the entry of the condemnation award, was held not to be such an interest
in the condemned property as to entitle the optionee to any share in the
207
award.
When considering a petition for certiorari in an eminent domain
proceeding, the supreme court will ordinarily grant "special dispensation"
in order that it may determine whether or not a sufficient issue as to the
"necessity for the taking" had been raised in the trial court.20 8 However, in
Howard Johnson v. State Road Department,20 9 certiorari was denied because
the appellant failed to allege sufficient facts to create an issue on that
subject.
The removal of lateral support from improved realty abutting a public
way-upon which road the State Road Department was making extensive
repairs-and the concomitant interference with the property owner's rights
of ingress, egress and view, in an equity suit were held210 not compensable
as a "taking" under the provisions of the Florida constitution.2 11 Damage
to adjoining land, however, may be awarded in a condemnation pro12
ceeding.
Dedication.-Controversies involving problems inherent in common
law and statutory dedications presented a comparatively prolific source of
litigation in the past two years.
In Servando Building Co. v. Zimmerman 21 the supreme court held
that conveyances in reference to a plat extended the title of lots abutting
streets and alleys to the center of such monuments. Hence, on abandonment
205. Wells v. Thomas, 93 So,2d 73 (Fla. 1956). Myakka Co. v. Edwards, 68 Fla.
372, 67 So. 217 (1914), used both terms, prior and between which brought about the
confusion,
206. Cravero v. State Turnpike Authority, 91 So.2d 312 (Fla. 1956).

207. Ibid.
208. Howard Johnson v. State Road Dept., 90 So.2d 306 (Fla. 1956).
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Ibid.
Weir v. West Palm Beach County, 85 So.2d 865 (Fla. 1956).
FA. CoNs'T D. OF R. § 12 Art. 16; FLA. CONS'T Art. XVI § 29.
FLA. STAT. § 73.10 (1957); see note 172 supra.
91 So.2d 289 (Fla. 1956).
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of such ways, the absolute title vested in the adjoining owners rather than
in a specific grantee of the dedicator. To accomplish this pragmatic result
the court gave considerable weight to the usual presumption that the
title normally extends to the center of monuments having width.
The plat contained a more or less customary reverter clause which
provided: ". . . Coral Gables Corporation . . . does hereby dedicate all
streets . . . to the free use of the public provided that if such use of any

part thereof shall or may be discontinued by law such part shall revert to
said Coral Gables Corporation, its successors and assigns

....

"

A city

ordinance discontinued one of the streets.
The supreme court, approaching the problem pragmatically, held that
the dedicatory language could not be construed as to prevent the vesting
of title in the abutting landowners.2 14 Although there was an ambiguity
as to the intention of the dedication (upon which Justice Roberts based
his dissent), 21 5 the language of the dedication was construed most strongly
against the dedicator. The provision in the dedication specifically reserving
title to the alleys for the use of the dedicator would appear completely
unambiguous, but the court held that it contravened the statute"' prohibiting
reservations of areas too small to be of practical use.
That private parties may obtain easements in land offered for dedication
is clearly established. 17 However, when the question arose in Burnham v.
Davis Island Inc.,21s as to whether certain private owners had obtained
an implied right of easement in lands reserved for use as a golf course, the
supreme court found no such right because of the express reservation in
the margin of the plat in favor of the dedicator. 219 Further, there was no
express grant, nor prescriptive use. Other cases dealing with dedication
held: The intention of the owner to allocate the lands for the use of the
public is the essence and basis of every dedication;2 20 any affirmative act
or permissive conduct on the part of a landowner that conclusively shows
his intention to dedicate, coupled with an acceptance by the public, is
sufficient to constitute a dedication; 221 an offer to dedicate lands for a
highway does not restrict the public to that portion of the highway used
for vehicular traffic, as use by the public for sidewalks, drainage facilities
214. Id. at 292.293.
215. Id. at 293.
216. FLA. STAT. § 17708 (1957).
217. See Boyer, Survey of Real Property, 8 MlAMI L.Q. 389, 420.421 (1954).
218. 87 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1956).
219. Id. at 98. The owner contemplates that the blocks, marked 'Reserved-See
Margin' may become a part of a golf course, but the owner expressly reserves the absolute
right to prescribe the terms of any dedication hereafter made or to subdivide or dispose
of the same in such manner as it may determine."
220. Pocock v. Town of Medley, 89 So.2d 162 (Fla. 1956).
221. Miami v. Jansik, 90 So.2d 316 (Fla. 1956), but no dedication found in instant
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or "grassy parkways" also constitutes an acceptance; 222 and an offer of dedi22 3
cation may be revoked at anytime prior to its acceptance.
When realty has been conveyed to a municipality to be dedicated to
the public for use as a park, a private individual can not enjoin the dedicated
public use unless he is injured in some unique manner. Consequently, in
Town of Flagler Beach v. Creen224 a hotel owner was unable to enjoin the
city's construction of recreational facilities which he alleged would obstruct
his view of the ocean.
Lands deeded to the Florida Board of Parks to be used for "park purposes" may be leased --5 by the Board to an individual proprietor who may
erect recreational facilities on the leased land, fees for the use of which will
be regulated by the Board.22- 1 In so deciding the supreme court adopted the
modern concept of a dedicated public park, 2 7 i.e., a reasonable portion of
a "park's" area may be allocated for golf, tennis, swimming, parking facilities
and other allied uses.
In order to circumvent the rather incongruous situation of having alleys
with entrances but without exits the supreme court, in an eminently practicable decision,228 decreed that an offer to dedicate two contiguous alleys
was wholly accepted by the city's action in paving one of them. 229
VI. LIENS AND MORTGAGES

Legislation; mechanic's liens.-

Paragraph (11)

(a), section 84.05 of

the Florida Statutes, the Mechanics' Lien Law, was amended by chapter
57-302.2 30 This section is designed to protect both lienors and property
owners by providing that the owner, when contracting for improvements
of $3,000.00 or more, may either require the contractor to furnish a surety
bond or else withhold the final payment and a percentage of each progress
payment until the contract is fully performed, final payment due, and a

statement under oath furnished as to the payment of laborers and sub-contractors. 281
The amendment (not altering the basic procedure or philosophy of the

section), was occasioned by the supreme court decision in Greenblatt v.
Goldin23 2 which invalidated the section as impairing liberty of contract and
222. Dade County v. Davis, 90 So.2d 316 (Fla. 1956).

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

(1955).
228.
229.
discussion
230.
231.
232.

Marion County v. Gary, 88 So.2d 749 (Fla. 1956).
Town of Flagler Beach v. Green, 83 So.2d 598 (Fla. 1956).
FLA. STAT. § 592.07 (1955).
Hanna v. Sunrise Recreation, 94 So.2d 597 (Fla. 1957).
McLauthlin v. City and County of Denver, 131 Colo. 22, 280 P.2d 1103

Waterman v. Smith, 94 So.2d 186 (Fla. 1957).
See Boyer, Survey of Real PropertyLaw, 8 MIAMI L.Q., 389, 420 (1954), for a
of the principle upon which this case was based.
Laws of Florida, c. 57.302 (1957).
FrA. STAT. § 84.05 (ll (a) (1957).
94 So.2d 355 (Fla. 1957).
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being so unreasonable and unconscionable as to deprive owners of their
property without due process of law. Specifically, only the following provision was found invalid:
If for any reason the owner fails to comply with the requirements
of this section, he shall be liable for, and the property improved
shall be subject to, a lien in the full amount of any and all outstanding bills for labor, services, or materials furnished for such
improvement
regardless of the time elements set forth in this
2 33
chapter.
The court, however, concluded that the invalidation of the above provision
invalidated the whole section because the portion left was not a "completed
and workable statute." 23 ' The concurring opinion 23 5 would have saved
236
the portions of the statute not specifically invalidated.
The invalidity of the statute consisted of two features: (1) the provision for personal liability of the owner who does not comply to the
extent of any and all outstanding bills, and (2) the imposition of such
liability regardless of the time elements in other provisions of the law 237 for
filing and prosecuting claims. The new act eliminates these objectionable
features by providing:
. . . the property improved shall be subject to a lien in the full
amount of any and all outstanding bills for labor, services, or materials furnished for such improvement; provided a claim of lien
is filed of record within three months as required by section 84.16,
and action to enforce it is commenced within one year from date
of filing, in accordance with section 84.21, or the lienor has been
made a party defendant in an action involving the real property
described in the claim of lien within the same period of time and
upon disposition
of such action the lienor's claim shall be dis128
charged.
Thus, the owner's liability is henceforth limited to a claim against
his realty, and he is afforded the protection of the time elements in the
statute. The statute as previously written, in addition to being more burdensome on the negligent but innocent owner, could have had a serious adverse
effect on the marketability of titles because of the imposition of such liens
without regard to statutory time elements.
Additional litigation was provoked by the Mechanics' Lien239 Law in
the past biennium. Perhaps the most noteworthy of which developed and
extended the basic proposition that such liens are founded on contract.
233. Id. at 359.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 360. The opinion concurred in part and dissented in part.

236. Id. It is to be noted that the suit was for a declaratory judgment by home
owners and that no personal liability was claimed by the lienors.
237. See FA. STAT. §§ 84.16, (84.21) (1955).
238. FiA. STAT. § 84.05(l])(a)
239. FLA. STAT. § 84.01 (1957).

(1957).
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It had been held in Florida that a (leasing) owner's acquiesence to improvements by his lessee is insufficient to subject his fee interest to a mechanics'
lien.2 40 However, in Brenner v. Smullian 41 this refuge of the landlord is
somewhat weakened. It was held therein that the lessor owner by taking
an active part in the renovation, and by requiring the lessee to make the
improvements in a specified manner, was deemed to have subjected his
24 2
Anderson v. Sokolik 243
interest in the fee to certain mechanics' liens.
goes further. In applying the doctrine of the Brenner case to the provisions
of the ninty-nine year lease in the Sokolik case, the supreme court stretched
the rationale to an inordinate degree. Atlhough the lease did not specifically
require or expressly authorize the construction of any type of improvement,
the court found that the mere contemplation of improvements by the lessee
was sufficient to subordinate the lessors' fee simple interest to mechanics'
liens. A well reasoned dissent by justice Drew2 44 berates the position of
the majority as doing violence to the law and resulting in substantial injustice
to the owner of the fee.
Failure to furnish an owner with a "cautionary notice ' 245 constituted a
common denomination in the resolution of three cases.2 48 Roberts v.
Lesser2' reaffirmed the well settled principle that a subcontractor is entitled to a lien up to that portion of the contract price which was not
"properly paid" regardless of whether or not a "cautionary notice" is furnished. 48 However, failure to present the "notice" will deprive the materialman of other statutory benefits. 249 When the owner acts as his own contractor it is unnecessary for a person in privity with him, in order to perfect
his lien,250 to deliver to him either a "cautionary notice" or a "sworn statement" that all lienors have been paid. 25 1 The failure of a sub-contractor
who is not in privity with the owner to furnish the "cautionary notice"
may, but does not always estop him from perfecting a lien against the
owner.25 2 While reiterating its position in re a possible estoppel, the court,
240. Masterbilt Corp. v. S. A. Ryan Motors Inc., 6 So.2d 818 (Fla. 1942).
241. 84 So.2d 44 (Fla. 1956).
242. FLA. STAT. § 84.03(2) (1957).

" . . . when an improvement is made by a
lessee in accordancewith a contract between such lessee and his lessor (emphasis supplied),

liens shall extend also to the interest of such lessor ...'
243. 88 So.2d 511 (Fla. 1956). The case is noted in II
244. Id. at 515.
245. FLA. STAT. § 84.04 (1) (1957).

"

MIA

. . . any lienor...

t L.Q. 435 (1957).
may . . . give to the

owner a written notice of intention to claim a lien, herein after called a 'notice' . . .
246. Roberts v. Lesser, 96 So.2d 222 (Fla. 1957); All State Pipe Supply Co. v.
McNair, 89 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1956); Orange Plumbing and Heating Co. v. Wolfe, 89
So.2d 671 (Fla. 1956).
247. Roberts v. Lesser, supra at 246.
248. Relief was denied, however, because there were no allegations of sums improperly paid or of an upaid balance, See also Boyer, Survey of Real Property, 8 MIAMI
L.Q. 389, 415 (1954).
249 FLA. STAT. § 84.06 (1957). This section sets forth an order of preference
for claims of lienors.
250. FLA. STAT. § 84.04(3) (1957).
251. Orange Plumbing and HeatingCo. v. Wolfe, 89 So.2d 671 (Fla. 1956).
252. All State Pipe Supply Co. v. McNair, 89 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1956).
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nevertheless permitted the lien and receded from its position in a former
case '5 3 wherein the owner had been protected because he had no reason
to believe that the contractor would subcontract. On the other hand,
estoppel was invoked and a lien denied to a claimant who, although he
served a cautionary notice, "receipted" his bill and executed a "release
of lien" in return for a worthless check from the contractor. 254 When a
sum is "improperly paid" i.e., "no sworn statement" received by the owner,
lienors have a right to have their liens perfeceted pro rata to the extend
of the "final payment" called for in the contract between the owner and
the general contractor.2 55
The fact that a relationship (construction joint venture), is apparently
incompatible or inconsistent with the existence of a mechanics' lien, does
not preclude the imposition of an equitable lien.2 8 Absent an allegation
of wrong-doing, the statute of limitations having run under the mechanics'
lien law 21T a materialman cannot seek relief by way of an equitable lien. 55
An action by a subcontractor lienor against an owner, who has contracted
with a general contractor, cannot be dismissed for failure to join an
indispensable party if the lienor does not join the general contractor as
29
a party defendant.
In Geiser v. Permacrete,2 0 wherein a mechanics' lien was given priority
over a mortgage which had been recorded before the mechanic had performed his labor, the blanket theory was considered. (A blanket lien
is one which operates in favor of all mechanics and materialmen, and
which "relates back" to the date when construction was first visibly commenced.) Recognizing the possible harms inherent in such a doctrine, the
court set forth the circumstances under which mechanics and materialmen
28
can come under its aegis. '
Mortgages. - Two attempts to foreclose mortgages resulted in judgments for the defendants. In Cullison v. Dees2 62 the supreme court resolved
the question of whether credit extended by a pledgee to a mortgagor acts
as payment to the mortgagee. The mortgagor contracted with the pledgee
of the mortgagee - who held mortgagor's note and mortgagee as security
for a separate debt of the mortgagee - to have pledgee credit him with
253. Southern Supply Distributors v. Lansdell, 76 So.2d 26 6(Fla. 1956). The case
was decided under similar facts, i.e., no notice given and no sworn statement received,
254. Lehman v. Snyder. 84 So.2d 312 (Fla. 1955).
255. Renuart Lumber Yards v. Steam, 95 So.2d 517 (Fla. 1957).
256. Green v. Putnam, 93 So.2d 378 (Fla. 1957).
257. FLA. STAT. § 84.01 (1957).
258. Road Co. v. Luber, 91 So.2d 629 (Fa. 1956).
259. Bybee v. Steam, 95 So.2d 529 (Fla. 1957); FLA. STAT. § 84.29 (1957).
260. 90 So.2d 610 (Fla. 1956).
261. Id. at 613. The material delivered, or service performed, must have been provided in connection with a single construction project; going forward under a common
plan; prosecuted with reasonable promptness and without material abandonment.
262. 90 So.2d 620 (Fla. 1956).
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partial payment on his pledged note. The mortgagee's foreclosure suit failed
because the transaction between the mortgagor and pledgee was deemed
proper payment on the pledged note, and consequently mortgagor (defendant) was not in default. In St. Martin v. McGee,' 3 the mortgagor's
alleged breach of covenant-to keep the premises in proper repair-resuited in no impariment of his security.
The supreme court, in a decision holding a note secured by a mortgage
non-usurious, 2 "1 vehemently, although fruitlessly, 2 5 castigated mortgage
companies. The note and mortgage due in one year was executed by the
mortgagor on December 5, 1954. The proceeds were not disbursed by the
mortgagee until December 13, 1954, the closing date. Interest which accrued
during those eight days if added to the face of the note would have made
the entire transaction usurious. 26 It was pointed out that in the instant
case the note was not predated or closing delayed with the intent to charge
the mortgagee interest on money he had not received. The mortgagee is
justified in requiring that the note and mortgage be executed and recorded
before disbursing the sums due the mortgagor. Consequently, the mortgagee's failure to abate the interest until the closing date was tantamount
to an error in closing adjustments and not usury.
267
the plaintiff
In Maule Industries v. Seminole Rock 6 Sand Co.,
contended that the issuance of the certificate of title, after a judicial sale
had been decreed, deprived the circuit court of jurisdiction26 8 to grant a
rehearing on objections 2 "t to the sale. The court held that the statutes 270
involved did not specifically proscribe the action taken by the chancellor;
therefore, as equity courts have a general supervision over judicial sales made
under their decrees, chancellors can set aside or vacate a sale for cause even
after confirmation.

VII.

LANDLORD AND TENANT

Security deposits.-in an action to supplement the final decree in
Kanter v. Safran27 J the lessee claimed that the lessor had abandoned his
263. 82 So.2d 736 (Fla. 1955).
264. Shaffran v. Holness, 93 So.2d 94 (Fla. 1957).
265.

Id. at 98. The 1957 legislatuie had an opportunity to remedy this situation

and failed to act.
266. FLA. STAT. § 687.03 (1955). It shall be usury . . . if by way of contract,
contrivance, or device whatever . . . the debtor is required or obligated to pay a sum
of money greater than the actual principal sum received, together with interest at the
rate of ten per cent.
267. 91 So.2d 307 (Fla. 1956).
268. FLA. STAT. § 702.07 (1957). The circuit courts . . . shall have jurisdiction,
power and authority to rescind, vacate and set aside a decree of foreclosure of a mortgage of property at any time before the sale thereof has actually been made . . .
269. FLA. STAT. § 702.02 (1957), piovides that if objections to the sale are not filed
within ten days after filing of the certificate of title thereupon the sale shall stand confirmed and title pass.
270. See notes 268 and 269 supra.
271. 82 So.2d 508 (Fla. 1955).
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position as the "agent of the lessee to relet the premises," an alternative
given the lessor in the prior decree.27 2 The lessee contended that since the
lessor had relet for a period longer than that of the original lease, the lessor
had abandoned his position as agent and the lessee was now entitled to
his security deposit. The court held that the lessor was entitled to make
the most favorable lease to himself and the lessee, and that the length of
the subsequent lease or its rental is not an indication of the lessor's forfeiture
of his agency relationship. That the security deposit need not be applied
to unpaid rent due was decided in 6701 Realty Inc. v. Deauville Enterprises.273 The court stated that the lease was breached upon failure to pay
the rent and that the landlord was not under an obligation to apply the
security deposit toward the rents prior to going into posession. Any other
interpretation of the security deposit would allow a tenant to stop paying
rent, stay in possession until the deposit ran out, and then leave, the landlord being left with nothing to compensate for the breached lease.
An unprofitable shopping center gave rise to an unusual set of facts
in Young v. Cobb. 2 4 The plaintiff was the only store owner still in business
in the shopping center. All the others had given up and left. The defendant
asked the plaintiff to leave so that the place could be sold, but the plaintiff
refused. After some discussion (heated, no doubt), the defendant padlocked
the store and the plaintiff brought this action for damages resulting from the
unlawful eviction and the return of his security deposit. The defendant
contended: (1) as to the unlawful eviction, that damages based upon future
earnings in a deserted shopping area were too speculative; and (2) as to
the security deposit, it was part of the rent and not returnable. Both his
contention were rejected; the court holding: (1) loss of business damages
could be reasonably ascertained and, (2) that security deposits must be
returned in those cases where the tenant is not the cause of the breached
lease since the deposit represents liquidated damages for the tenant's breach.
Obligation to repair.- The court listed three remedies available to a
lessee for the landlord's failure to keep the premises in good repair in
Rosen v. Needlenwn: 2 5 (I) the disrepair renders the building uninhabitable,
the tenant may abandon the premises and not be liable for future rents;
(2) if the building is uninhabitable the tenant may, after notice to the
landlord, make the necessary repairs and sue the landlord for damages
(the cost of the repairs and loss of profits); (3) if the building is inhabitable,
the tenant may do nothing and sue the landlord for damages. In this case,
the lessee of a hotel chose the third alternative and sued for loss of profits
272. Kanter v. Safran, 68 So.2d 553 (Fla. 1953). This case was discussed in Wills,
Survey of Landlord and Tenant, 10 MAMI L.Q. 383 (1956).
274. 83 So.2d 417 (Fla. 1955).
273. 84 So.2d 325 (a. 1955).
274. 83 So.2d 417 (Fa. 1955).
275. 83 So.2d 113 (FA. 1955).
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due to a reduced rental income made necessary by lowering the rates oi
the rooms in disrepair. The court approved the remedy despite the land
lord's contention that the tenant should have repaired the premises an(
sued for costs.
Estoppel; surrender by operation of law and double rent. - In Centra
Florida Oil Company v. Blue Flame Inc.,276 the parties, in 1950, execute(
a lease of realty for a term of fifteen years. In 1953 the parties executec
a second lease of the same property for a term of one year with an optior
to renew. Various immaterial assignments were made. At the end of th
term of the 1953 lease the tenants refused to renew the lease and notifiec
the landlord that they would continue to hold possession under the 195(
lease. The landlord sued to regain possession and sought double rent fo
the tenants' occupation beyond the term. The court held that the act:
of the tenants in executing the 1953 lease and occupying the premises undel
its terms were inconsistent with and precluded the tenants' claim of righ
under the 1950 lease, and it cited Rader v. Prather2T7 as authority.
Section 83.06 of the Florida Statutes provides that if the tenant refuse!
to give up possession at the end of the term, the landlord may demanc
double the monthly rent. The court concluded that if the tenant maintainec
possession under a bona fide claim of right based upon reasonable grounds
the statute should not apply. It considered the tenants' claim under th
1950 lease to be bona fide and reasonable for the purpose of avoiding th
statute, particularly since the complaint in the lower court did not demand
the penalty?.1

276. 87 So.ld 812 (Fla. 1956).
277. 100 Fla. 591, 130 So.15 (Fla. 1930).
278. Painter v. Town of Groveland, Fla., 79 So.2d 765 (Fla. 1955), was cited foi
authority.

